No Band of Brothers: Problems of the Rebel High Command by Woodworth, Steven E. Missing dust jacket; Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less
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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherUniversity of Missouri Press
ISBN-100826212557
ISBN-139780826212559
eBay Product ID (ePID)785064
Product Key Features
Number of Pages208 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameNo Band of Brothers : Problems of the Rebel High Command
Publication Year1999
SubjectUnited States / State & Local / South (Al, Ar, Fl, Ga, Ky, La, ms, Nc, SC, Tn, VA, WV), Military / General, United States / Civil War Period (1850-1877), Military / Wars & Conflicts (Other), Security (National & International)
TypeTextbook
AuthorSteven E. Woodworth
Subject AreaPolitical Science, History
SeriesShades of Blue and Gray Ser.
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height0.8 in
Item Weight18.1 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceCollege Audience
LCCN99-035480
Dewey Edition21
Grade FromCollege Freshman
Series Volume Number1
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal973.7/3
Grade ToCollege Graduate Student
SynopsisThe Civil War was barely over before Southerners and other students of the war began to examine the Confederate high command in search of an explanation for the South's failure. Although years of research failed to show that the South's defeat was due to a single, overriding cause, the actions of the Southern leaders during the war were certainly among the reasons the South lost the war. In No Band of Brothers, Steven Woodworth explores, through a series of essays, various facets of the way the Confederacy waged its unsuccessful war for secession. He examines Jefferson Davis and some of his more important generals, including Pierre G. T. Beauregard, Leonidas Polk, Joseph E. Johnston, Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, and Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson; the Confederacy's strategic plans; and the South's success in making competent officers out of men with very little military preparation. Woodworth particularly looks at the personalities and personal relationships that affected the course and outcome of the war. What made a good general? What could make an otherwise able man a failure as a general? What role did personal friendships or animosities play in the Confederacy's top command assignments and decisions? How successful was the Confederacy in making competent generals out of its civilian leaders? In what ways did Jefferson Davis succeed or fail in maximizing the chances for the success of his cause? In analyzing the Confederate leadership, Woodworth reveals some weaknesses, many strengths, and much new information. No Band of Brothers will be an important addition to Civil War scholarship and will be welcomed by professional historians, amateur historians, students, and the general reader alike.